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Abstract
We analyze the e⁄ects of changes in the mortality rate upon life expectancy,
education, retirement age, human capital and growth in the presence of social secu-
rity. We build a vintage growth, overlapping generations model in which individuals
choose the time length of education and retirement age, and where unfunded social
security pensions depend on workers￿past contributions. Social security has a pos-
itive e⁄ect on education, but pension bene￿ts favor reductions in retirement age.
The net e⁄ect is that starting from a benchmark case, higher life expectancies give
rise to lower growth rates in the presence of social security as the share of active
population is reduced. In addition, higher social security contribution rates reduce
the growth rate.
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This article intends to integrate two streams of the economic literature generally
considered separately: i) life expectancy and endogenous growth; and ii) aging,
unfunded social security and exogenous economic growth.
The relationship between life expectancy at birth and per capita growth has been
largely studied both empirically and theoretically. Regarding the empirical evidence,
the hypothesis that reductions in mortality rates have a non monotonic relationship
with per growth rates is mostly supported. By using time series data, Rodriguez
et al. (1999) ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of life expectancy upon GDP growth rate in
Venezuela in 1970-90. However, Malmberg (1994) ￿nds a negative relationship in
Sweden in 1950-89. Analysis of cross section data also shows that this relationship
is not monotonic. Preliminary data from Latin America and Caribbean countries
indicate that GDP growth is positively associated with life expectancy. [See World
Health Organization (1999), Box 1.2, p. 9.] Barro et al. (1995), using a sample of 97
countries, estimate that an increment in life expectancy of 13 years would increase
per capita growth rate by 1.4% per year. Zhang et al. (2005) shows a clear, positive
relationship, but at a diminishing rate. Finally, some other studies have found mixed
evidence: increases in life expectancy have paralleled higher growth rates for low life
expectancies, but lower growth rates for high life expectancies. [See Zhang et al.
(2003) and references therein.]
Regarding theoretical works, they mostly assume that human capital accumula-
tion is the engine of growth. Some of them conclude that the relationship is always
positive, whereas some others are able to obtain an inverted U pattern. Among
the former we could mention Ehrlich et al. (1991) and Hu (1999). In this type of
models, a higher life expectancy increases the period length in which the return to
human capital investment is obtained, thus allowing for higher rates of return, and,
2in consequence, higher investment and growth rates.1
Some other works have obtained an inverted U pattern between life expectancy
and per capita growth what is consistent with the mixed empirical evidence above
mentioned (both with historical and cross-section data). De la Croix et al. (1999)
build up an economy where the e⁄ect of a reduction in the mortality rate upon
the duration of education is such that the growth rate becomes higher for high
mortality rates (as in underdeveloped countries), but lower for low mortality rates
(as in industrialized countries). The same result is obtained in Boucekkine et al.
(2002), where they assume uncertain lifetime horizon and endogenous retirement
age. In both papers, labor force is the unique input in production, and the intuition
behind the negative sloped part is that average human capital of the labor force
becomes more obsolete as life expectancy increases.2 Zhang and Zhang (2003) and
Zhang et al. (2003) also obtain this result but by means of a di⁄erent channel: not
through own education time, but through the expenditure on children￿ s education.
Regarding the second line of research mentioned in the beginning of the section,
a considerable number of articles in the recent literature deal with the connections
between population aging, pay-as-you-go social security and retirement age. One
recurring subject in this literature is the e⁄ect of social security upon workers￿
voluntary retirement age. Along these lines, the available empirical evidence suggests
that, at least for the US economy, social security is relevant for retirement age issues,
even though there is no total agreement on the e⁄ects of variations in the generosity
of the social security program. [See, e.g., Diamond et al. (1997) and Coile et al.
(2000).]
1Echevarr￿a (2003) shows in an exogenous retirement model in which human capital investment
depends positively on the number of remaining active periods until the individual￿ s retirement that
increases in life expectancy give rise to higher growth rates only if accompanied by simultaneous
exogenous increments in the active period (i.e., delays in the retirement age).
2Building on Boucekkine et al. (2002), but allowing for physical capital along with human
capital in a certain lifetime horizon, Echevarr￿a (2004) obtains the same relationship.
3In this article we study to what extent introducing unfunded social security af-
fects the relationship between life expectancy and per capita growth rate, taking
into account its e⁄ects on education and retirement age incentives. Our starting
point is Boucekkine et al. (2002). It is, in essence, an overlapping generations
model with uncertain, ￿nite lifetime horizon. Fertility and mortality rates are ex-
ogenous, and individuals choose their optimal education time length and retirement
age, thereby way in￿ uencing average human capital in a vintage way and the econ-
omy￿ s growth. In our extension we include an unfunded social security system whose
pension bene￿ts depend on the contributions made by workers during their active
periods. According to this design, social security will in￿ uence not only individ-
ual decisions (namely, years of education and retirement age), but also aggregate
magnitudes such as economic growth.
Why might the inclusion of social security be of any interest? In such a setup
the return to human capital investment is not constrained to labor income while
active, but also extends to pensions during retirement, which are in turn related to
past wage earnings. Therefore, when individuals choose their optimal length of the
education period, they take into account not only the e⁄ect on future labor earnings,
but also on future pension bene￿ts. Additionally, voluntary retirement age will also
depend on the incentives that the public pension system embeds. As a consequence,
we have that social security will a⁄ect the size of the working population and also
that of the aggregate human capital in the economy. Therefore, social security will
in￿ uence the response of the economy￿ s growth rate after, say, a fall in the mortality
rate and the corresponding increase in the life expectancy.
This article contains two di⁄erent parts. In part one we solve analytically the
individual problem (individuals and ￿rms), the steady state per capita growth rate
and the social security budget balance. We characterize the parameter space which
4determines the type of solution for the individuals￿problem and prove the exis-
tence and the uniqueness of that solution. Furthermore, we prove the existence and
uniqueness of steady state per capita growth rate and social security balance for the
case of interior solutions for education and retirement age.
In part two, given that the system of equations that solves the model turns out to
be non-linear, explicit solutions and analytical results are excluded. Thus, we limit
our results to numerical solutions to comparative statics exercises between steady
states. We compare two scenarios (with and without unfunded social security). We
are able to replicate the observed inverted U relationship between life expectancy
and per capita growth in our scenario with social security. Our main ￿nding is
that introducing social security a⁄ects the incentives to education time and early
retirement in such a way that the major force driving the negatively sloped part
of that locus is the fall of the share of active population (i.e. workers), not the
obsolescence of human capital among workers as it is the case when there is no
social security.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the main demo-
graphic features of our model. Readers interested only in the economic aspects may
proceed to the next Section. Section 3 introduces the economic model: the indi-
vidual problem, the aggregate technology of production, the optimal education and
retirement age, the aggregates, the social security balance and the balanced growth
path. The numerical example and the results are shown in Section 4. Section 5
shows the conclusions. A mathematical Appendix contains the formal proofs.
52 Demographic structure
Individuals face an uncertain lifetime horizon with a positive, age increasing instan-
taneous mortality rate, so that there exists a maximum attainable age.3
More precisely, the demographic structure in this economy is characterized by




; 0 ￿ a ￿ J; ￿ > 1; ￿ < 0; (1)
where m(a) ￿ Prob(ai ￿ a), ai denoting an individual￿ s death age. That is, (1)
represents the probability of being alive at age a. J denotes the maximum attainable
age which corresponds to a 0 survival probability,




One can obtain Yaari-Blanchard￿ s perpetual youth model with a survival probability
m(a) = e￿￿a for ￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0 as a limiting case [Blanchard (1985)]. Population
in this economy is stable in that, in the absence of migratory movements, the age
distributions of fertility and mortality rates have remained constant for a long enough
time. Therefore, the age distribution and the growth rate of population are constant
as well [Schoen (1988)]. We do not consider explicitly the age distribution of the
fertility rate in our model. However, we will show the links between parameters
￿ and ￿, the population growth rate and the average fertility rate later on [see
equation (9)]. Increments in both ￿ and in ￿ imply higher survival probabilities,
but in a di⁄erent manner. An increase in ￿ means a reduction in young individuals￿
mortality; however, a higher ￿ is equivalent to lower mortality for old individuals.









3This Section closely follows the ￿rst Section in Boucekkine et al. (2002).
6In words, (3) represents the probability of dying at the age a. Denoting by x a random
variable meaning ￿remaining lifetime until death￿ , one obtains the probability of




; 0 ￿ x ￿ J ￿ a: (4)
From (4) one obtains the (conditional) life expectancy for an individual of age a,
or the average number of additional periods that one individual of age a expects to
live as






1 ￿ [1 + (J ￿ a)￿]e￿￿(J￿a)￿
￿(e￿￿a ￿ ￿)
:
From (5) and (2) it is possible to solve EV (0) for two particular cases: i) the life
expectancy at age a = J, EV (J) = 0; and ii) at age a = 0, i.e., the life expectancy








One can obtain, also as a limiting case for ￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0, Yaari-Blanchard￿ s
perpetual youth model [Blanchard (1985)] with a life expectancy which turns out to
be age independent, EV (a) = 1=￿.
EV (0) is increasing both in ￿ and in ￿, but (as we mentioned above) increases in
￿ and in ￿ give rise to di⁄erent kinds of increments in life expectancy. Along these
lines, Kalemli-Ozcan (2002b), p. 411, claims that during the last two centuries life
expectancy at birth has doubled in most parts of the world mostly due to larger falls
in child rather than adult mortality. Boucekkine et al. (2002), quoting Kelley and
Schmidt (1995), claim that in less developed countries mortality drops concentrate
on young and working age individuals. Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001) claim that
7during the early stages of mortality falls these concentrate on the younger population
(at ages previous to reproduction); but as mortality keeps going down from low
enough levels, most additional years are gained at ages after retirement age. From










￿(￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ln￿)
￿(￿ ￿ 1)2 > 0:
Population is assumed to grow at an exogenous, constant rate n, so that the measure
of births at ￿ can be expressed as
￿(￿) = ￿e
n￿, ￿ > 0; n ￿ 0: (7)
Given (1), (2) and (7), after some algebra, one obtains the measure of population





￿(t)m(￿ ￿ t)dt = ￿e
n￿￿; (8)
where ￿ is de￿ned as
￿ =
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿n=￿) + n(￿ ￿ 1)
(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ + n)n
> 0: (9)
From (7) and (8) it is easy to interpret ￿ as the inverse of the fertility ratio, where this
is de￿ned as the ratio of the measure of births to the measure of total population at
(any) moment ￿, 1=￿ = ￿(￿)=P(￿). Thus, an increase in life expectancy (regardless
of whether ￿ or ￿ becomes larger) implies two extreme cases: i) a higher population
growth rate n if the fertility ratio is kept constant, or ii) a reduction in the fertility
ratio ￿￿1 if the population growth rate is unchanged. 5
The demographic structure that we use here, characterized by (1) and n [or,
alternatively, by (1) and ￿] is exogenous because neither the number of children
4The sign of @EV (0)=@￿ is proven by de￿ning f(￿) = ￿￿1￿ln￿, and checking that f(1) = 0,
f0(1) = 0 and f00(￿) = ￿￿2 > 0. Recall the restriction ￿ > 1.
5See Kalemli-Ozcan (2002b) who reports the fall in fertility rates for Holland, Sweden, United
Kingdom, Africa, Asia and Latin America.
8is an individual choice, nor the survival probability depends, for instance, on per
capita income or (private or public) health expenditure.6
From (1), (7) and (8) it is possible to obtain the probability density function for
age a as the ratio of the measure of individuals born at ￿ ￿ a and still alive at ￿ to








The instantaneous mortality rate at age a, denoted as ￿(a), is de￿ned as the
ratio of the measure of individuals who die at age a to the measure of individuals









￿ ￿ e￿￿a > 0; (11)






(￿ ￿ e￿￿a)2 > 0:
Observed mortality rates are not strictly increasing with age, however, because they
fall during childhood.7 Once more, we can obtain Yaari-Blanchard￿ s perpetual youth
model with a positive, age independent mortality rate as a limiting case: if ￿ = 0
and ￿ > 0, then ￿(a) = ￿ > 0. [See Blanchard (1985).] The simplicity of the
demographic structure that we are using here [as only three parameters ￿, ￿ and
n, and two equations, (1) and (9), are needed if migratory movements are absent],
make this demographic structure highly attractive for theoretical models.
6See, among others, Kalemli-Ozcan (2002b) as an example of endogenous demographic struc-
ture, or Zhang and Zhang (2003) and references therein on e⁄ects of social security on fertility
rates.
7For the U.S. case, for instance, at least since the 1940￿ s the death rate attains its minimum at
the 5-14 year age group, regardless of sex and race. See Vital Statistics, in U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005, Table 96, p. 75.
9The mean age and the median age of population, ￿ a and ^ a, respectively, can be
obtained from (2) and (10) as ￿ a =
R J









1 ￿ (1 + nJ)e￿nJ￿
n2 ￿
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In spite of the simplicity of this demographic model, it is possible to approximate
observed age distributions in terms of life expectancy, maximum age and median
age reasonably well. [See Table 1]
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
The pattern is clear: falls in the rate of population growth and in the rate of
mortality accompany increments in life expectancy at birth and in the mean age,
median age and maximum attainable age.
For illustration purposes only, Figures 1:a ￿ b show how changes in ￿ a⁄ect
the growth rate n, the life expectancy EV (0), the mean age ￿ a and the median age
^ a. Falls in the mortality rate through increments in ￿ force population aging: life
expectancy, mean age and median age are raised; likewise, the population growth
rate n increases. Although not shown for reasons of space, di⁄erences about whether
the origin is an increase in ￿ or in ￿ (or whether n or ￿ is kept constant) are purely
quantitative.
[INSERT FIGURES 1.A-B AROUND HERE]
3 The economy
Following Boucekkine et al. (2002), time is represented as a continuous variable.
At each instant ￿ there exists a continuum of cohorts born at di⁄erent instants t.
10A unique good is produced and it can be consumed, but not accumulated in the
form of physical capital. Its price is normalized to one. Production technology uses
human capital as the only production factor.
We assume that perfect annuity markets exist. Individuals do not save in physical
capital (it does not exist), but in annuities. This kind of asset yields a return to
its holder as long as he/she is alive. After his/her death, the property of the asset
goes back to the insurance company that issued the asset. Thus, even if there were
physical capital and individuals were not altruistic (so that they did not intend to
leave bequests to their heirs), they would always prefer to save in annuities rather
than in physical capital. The return of annuities would always be higher than that
of physical capital because, in exchange, they would give back the annuities to
the issuing company in case of death. This way the problem posed by unintended
positive bequests is removed. Assuming that negative bequests are forbidden by
law, individuals would also prefer to borrow in annuities. In exchange for cancelling
out the debt in case of death, borrowers are forced to paying an extra return that
compensates the lending company for the default risk in case of death.8
3.1 The individual problem
Denoting by t birth date and ￿ calendar time, the problem that an individual faces
consists in ￿nding the consumption path C(t;￿), the length of the education period
T(t) and the retirement age R(t) which maximize his/her expected lifetime utility.9
8This type of institution is often used in theoretical models as a means to avoid accidental
bequests. For instance, Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001), Fuster (1999), De la Croix and Licandro
(1999), Boucekkine et al. (2002). In the following section we show that, ￿rst, the instantaneous
return of annuities depends on the individual￿ s age. Regardless of whether he/she is a borrower
or a lender, the return is equal to the instantaneous probability of death which depends on age as
we have seen in (11). And, second, insurance companies issuing annuities obtain zero pro￿ts in
equilibrium. [Yaari (1965).]
9In our case retirement does not obey workers￿health related issues, for instance, but leisure
time preference. [See Sabatini and Mitchell (1999).]
11Workers￿education has both micro consequences (higher labor income) and, as we
will see later on, macro consequences (eventually, higher economic growth for the
whole economy in the aggregate).
Instantaneous utility depends linearly on consumption.10 Disutility from time
spent on education and working (i.e., other than in retirement) goes up as individ-
ual￿ s age ￿ ￿t increases. It also depends negatively on average human capital in the
economy ￿ H(t) at birth. Given that we will consider only steady state paths along
which individual choices R(t) and T(t) remain time invariant, the marginal disu-
tility of postponing retirement an additional period must be proportional to ￿ H(t).
This is so because marginal utility out of the additional labor income obtained as a
result of postponing retirement age one period is also proportional to ￿ H(t). In sum,
if devoting time to education and working means less leisure time, lifetime utility
depends negatively on retirement age.
Thus, expected lifetime utility is given by
Z t+J
t





(￿ ￿ t)m(￿ ￿ t)d￿; ￿ > 0; (14)
where 1=￿ stands for the disutility which both education and work time represent
in terms of lost leisure.
The human capital with which this individual enters the labor market h(t) de-
pends on the number of periods devoted to education T(t) and on the human capital
in the economy at the time of his/her birth ￿ H(t). In particular,
h(t) = ￿ ￿ H(t)T(t); ￿ > 0: (15)
There is, therefore, an externality in the production of human capital. It seems
reasonable to assume that for a given education period, the human capital the
10We ￿rst tried to use a CRRA (logarithmic, in particular) instantaneous utility function in
order to obtain an explicit solution for consumption in a previous version of this article. However,
the non linearity of the model increased substantially, giving rise to a multiplicity of solutions.
12individual accumulates is higher the higher the knowledge in the economy as a
whole. This is, therefore, a public good that individuals enjoy but do not have to
pay for. Similar mechanisms have been used previously in the theoretical literature.
[See, e.g., Zhang and Zhang (2003), Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001)-(2003), Azariadis
and Drazen (1990), Lucas (1988), Lucas (1990), Einarsson and Marquis (1996),
Echevarr￿a (2003)-(2004) or Nerlove et al. (1993)]. Also, empirical evidence largely
supports the positive e⁄ect of class and school composition on individual students￿
educational attainment or the positive e⁄ect of local workers with longer education
upon individual wages. [See Benabou (1993) and references therein.]
During his/her active life the individual is paid a gross wage per unit of e¢ cient
labor equal to !(￿), and pays a (pay-as-you-go) social security tax at a constant
rate s 2 (0;1). Thus, the net labor income obtained by this individual at time ￿ is
equal to
w(t;￿) = (1 ￿ s)!(￿)h(t): (16)
For simplicity, we assume that there is no depreciation of individual human capi-
tal while individuals remain on-the-job. Along these lines, Stokey and Rebelo (1995)
claim that the largest source of depreciation of aggregate human capital comes from
the fact that lifetimes are ￿nite. Therefore, OLG models allow a more satisfactory
treatment of this issue than in￿nite horizon representative agent models. This, in
turn, raises a new problem: how human capital is transmitted from one generation
to the next. In our model current generations learn from previous generations: they
take advantage of the accumulated knowledge in the society when they are in their
education period.
After retirement, the individual is paid a pension bene￿t equal to b(t). The
relationship between social security contribution and pension bene￿t is given by the
replacement rate # which we de￿ne (purely for analytical convenience) in terms of
13average net wage income obtained during the active period,






R(t)￿T(t)d￿ = h(t)￿ !(t), if R(t) > T(t)
0, if R(t) = T(t)
(18)
denotes the average gross wage income earned along the same period. That is, ￿ !(t)
￿ [R(t) ￿ T(t)]
￿1 R t+R(t)
t+T(t) !(￿)d￿ represents the average gross wage per e¢ ciency unit
earned while active.11; 12 This way, when making his/her optimal plan for education,
the individual takes into account that more education time not only means higher
wages while active, but also higher pension bene￿ts while retired.












(￿ ￿ t)m(￿ ￿ t)d￿ (19)
subject to
8
> > > > > > <







w(t;￿) = (1 ￿ s)!(￿)h(t);
h(t) = ￿ ￿ H(t)T(t);
b(t) = #(1 ￿ s)￿ w(t);
￿ w(t) = h(t)￿ !(t);
R(t) ￿ J;
(20)
where D(t;￿) denotes the discount factor that applies between t and ￿; that is, the
price that an individual pays in t for one unit of consumption at time ￿ (contingent
on being alive at that time).
11In some countries pension bene￿ts are linked to the worker￿ s wage history: that is the case,
among others, of the US [Diamond and Gruber (1997)] and Spain [Boldrin et al. (1997)]. In other
countries, such as the UK, Holland or Sweden, pension bene￿ts are the universal type. [See Miles
(1999).] Zhang and Zhang (2003) assume a mixed setup: part of the pension bene￿ts is based on
the wage income obtained during the active period, while the rest is of a universal nature.
12Pension bene￿ts in our model are proportional to the average wage income earned while active
for simplicity, but alternative assumptions could be made. For instance, the relationship between
pension bene￿ts and average wage income in the US and in Spain is increasing, of course, but
concave. This might increase the incentives to early retirement. [See Diamond and Gruber (1997),
pp. 7 y 8, and JimØnez-Mart￿n and SÆnchez (1999) pp. 49 and 50].
14Upon substituting the second to fourth restrictions into the ￿rst one in (20), one




















D(t;￿)#(1 ￿ s)￿ !(t)￿ ￿ H(t)T(t)d￿
￿
￿ v(t)[R(t) ￿ J]:
￿(t) ￿ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget
constraint (the marginal utility of income), and v(t) ￿ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the restriction that retirement age cannot exceed the maximum age
limit J. Notice that (24) is linear in C(t;￿), so that we are implicitly assuming that
consumption is non-negative.












(￿ ￿ t)m(￿ ￿ t)d￿ (22)
subject to
8
> > > > > > > > > <







w(t;￿) = (1 ￿ s)!(￿)h(t);
h(t) = ￿ ￿ H(t)T(t);
b(t) = #(1 ￿ s)￿ w(t);
￿ w(t) = h(t)￿ !(t);





where D(t;￿) denotes the discount factor that applies between t and ￿; i.e., the
price that an individual pays in t for one unit of consumption at time ￿ (contingent
on being alive at that time).
Upon substituting the second to fourth restrictions into the ￿rst one in (20), one




















D(t;￿)#(1 ￿ s)￿ !(t)￿ ￿ H(t)T(t)d￿
￿
￿ v(t)[R(t) ￿ J];
where ￿ !(t) ￿ [R(t) ￿ T(t)]
￿1 R t+R(t)
t+T(t) !(￿)d￿, ￿(t) ￿ 0 denotes the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint (the marginal utility of
income), and v(t) ￿ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the restriction that
retirement age cannot exceed the maximum age limit J. Notice that (24) is linear
in c(t;￿), so that we are implicitly assuming that consumption is non-negative.
The corresponding ￿rst order necessary conditions are given by
@L
@c(t;￿)







￿(t)￿ ￿ H(t)T(t)![t + R(t)](1 ￿ s)D[t + R(t);t]












![t + R(t)] ￿ [R(t) ￿ T(t)] ￿
R t+R(t)
t+T(t) !(￿)d￿
[R(t) ￿ T(t)]2 ; (27)
R(t) ￿ J; v(t)[R(t) ￿ J] = 0; v(t) ￿ 0 (28)
16@L
@T(t)
= 0 , 0 = ￿(t)
Z t+R(t)
t+T(t)
D(t;￿)(1 ￿ s)!(￿)￿ ￿ H(t)d￿ (29)
















￿![t + T(t)] ￿ [R(t) ￿ T(t)] +
R t+R(t)
t+T(t) !(￿)d￿
[R(t) ￿ T(t)]2 : (30)
In (26) we obtain that the marginal disutility of postponing retirement age for
one additional period (in terms of lost leisure) must be equal to the marginal utility
out of the augmented consumption that the additional income allows. Suppose that
the retirement age is postponed one additional period. Note that i) ￿(t) represents
the expected marginal utility out of income; ii) the sum of the terms that multiply
￿(t) is the marginal increase of the discounted future labor income; and iii) v(t)
is the expected marginal utility out of increasing the maximum lifetime horizon J
(relevant if the restriction R(t) ￿ J is binding).
By de￿nition, one has that D(t;t) ￿ 1 and that m(t￿t) = m(0) = 1; therefore,
from (25) we obtain
￿(t) = 1, and m(￿ ￿ t) = D(t;￿): (31)
Given that the utility function is linear in c(t;￿), so is the Lagrangian (24): if
no restrictions are imposed on the optimal consumption plan, the maximum of
(24) is not well de￿ned unless m(￿ ￿ t) = D(t;￿). That is, budget constraint and
indi⁄erence curve coincide. If one imposed the non-negativity of c(t;￿) in an explicit
manner, then (24) should be rewritten allowing for slackness variables. In that case,
the equality between the discount factor D(t;￿) and the survival probability m(￿￿t)
would be obtained only for interior solutions.











￿1. Upon di⁄erentiating both
sides with respect to ￿, we obtain that
r(￿) =
￿￿e￿￿(￿￿t)
￿ ￿ e￿￿(￿￿t) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ t): (32)
In other words, the instantaneous rate of return at time ￿ for an individual born at
t is identical to his/her instantaneous mortality rate de￿ned in (11). An implication
of (32) is that, assuming that insurance companies issuing annuities are risk neutral
and perfectly competitive, they obtain zero pro￿ts (as expected). Denoting the
stock of assets at time ￿ of an individual born at t by W(t;￿), the costs of the
insurance company would be equal to r(￿)W(t;￿). But its revenues would be equal
to ￿(￿ ￿ t)W(t;￿) because a fraction ￿(￿ ￿ t) of individuals of age ￿ ￿ t would give
back all their assets to the company on dying.
As we will see in subsection 3.2, wages per e¢ ciency unit ! are constant, so
that the derivatives in (27) and (30) are identically equal to zero, and ￿ !(t) = !.




R(t)m[R(t)] + ￿ ￿ H(t)T(t)!(1 ￿ s)m[R(t)] (33)
￿#(1 ￿ s)!￿ ￿ H(t)T(t)m[R(t)] ￿ v(t) = 0:
There are two open possibilities. i) If the optimal R(t) is an interior solution,
R(t) < J, then v(t) = 0. From (33) one obtains R(t) = ￿￿T(t)(1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ #)!: ii)
If the optimal R(t) is a corner solution, then v(t) ￿ 0 and R(t) = J. Thus, we will
have that
R(t) = minf￿￿T(t)(1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ #)!;Jg: (34)









Notice that (35) implies that T(t) = T and, therefore, from (34) we have that
R(t) = R. That is, optimal education time length and retirement age are constant.
A key parameter for our discussion and one we will use repeatedly is ￿ ￿ ￿￿. If we

























3.2 Technology of aggregate production
We assume that production technology is linear in human capital,
Y (￿) = !H(￿), ! > 0; (38)
where Y (￿) denotes aggregate production and H(￿) aggregate human capital at ￿.
The latter is equal to the sum of individual stocks of human capital across workers
of di⁄erent ages (born at di⁄erent t￿ s, but active at ￿). This is, in sum, a vintage
model as explained in detail in subsection 3.4. Therefore not only is the time ￿
at which human capital is measured relevant, but so is the education length T,
retirement age R and age distribution of the population. Marginal productivity
of human capital ! is constant and equals the (gross) wage per unit of e¢ ciency.
The parallelism with AK technologies in which production is proportional to the
stock of aggregate capital in equilibrium is obvious. [See, among others, Barro and
Sala-i-Mart￿n (1995) for details.]
193.3 School and retirement in equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize optimal education periods and retirement age.
We will make the following distinction:
a) interior solutions: 0 < T < R < J, and
b) corner solutions which, in turn, can be of two types:
b.1) 0 < T < R = J. In this case, planned retirement is given by the
maximum lifetime horizon, and education period is equal to the upper bound for
interior solutions for T (which we will characterize later on); and
b.2) 0 = T = R < J. In this case individuals choose neither to invest in human
capital nor to enter the labor market. If so, both labor income and pension bene￿ts
are zero. This is possible given our assumption of linear utility from consumption.
3.3.1 Interior solution: 0 < T < R < J:
In this subsection we ￿nd the conditions upon parameter ￿ for the existence and






where a necessary condition that ￿ and ￿0 (or, equivalently, ￿, s, # and !) must
satisfy for R > T > 0 is that
￿ > ￿0: (40)
Intuitively, given the de￿nitions of ￿ and ￿0, for individuals to devote a part of their
lifetimes to education and a part to active work one needs: i) high gross wages
(high !), ii) low social security contribution rates (low s), iii) high productivity
of investment in human capital (high ￿), iv) low disutility of time not devoted to
leisure (high ￿), and v) low replacement rates (low #).
20Note that if the solution is interior, R is proportional to T and, in particular,
R = ￿(1 ￿ #)(1 ￿ s)!T. Therefore, for a given #, the discouraging e⁄ect that a
higher s has upon T is enlarged when we look at the e⁄ect upon R. This point will
be relevant when we carry out our numerical exercise en Section 4.
Assuming that ￿ > ￿0, from (36), (37) and (39), optimal T is given by
Tm(T) = G1(T) + G2(T); (41)












In other words, for T to be optimal the cost of an additional education period (in
terms of foregone wages) must be equal to the increment in the sum of expected
discounted future wages plus expected pension bene￿ts as a result of that additional
learning period.




￿ Tmax(￿) < J: (43)
There is, therefore, an upper bound for the optimal T (not only for interior solutions,
but -as we will see- also for corner solutions in which R = J and T ￿ Tmax).
Introducing unfunded social security with positive # and s, raises the lower bound
of ￿ for interior solutions slightly higher than the one required in Boucekkine et al.
(2002). [See Boucekkine et al. (2002), Lemma 2.3, p. 350, who obtain ￿ > 2 as a
necessary condition for interior solution]. Assuming [as Boucekkine et al. (2002)]
! = 1, one has that ￿0 = [(1￿s)(1￿#)]￿1 need not be higher than 2. For instance,
the productivity of education time in the production of individual human capital
need not be so high as to induce individuals to spend a fraction of their lifetimes on
accumulating knowledge. Why? Because in the presence of a social security system
21like ours (unfunded and whose pension bene￿ts depend positively on earned labor
income in the past) pension bene￿ts represent an additional incentive to the wage
income obtained during the active period. In other words, pension bene￿ts reduce
the depreciation of human capital that a ￿nite active period represents for workers.
A graphical argument may be useful to understand the last discussion. [See
Figure 2.]
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]









T m(￿)d￿. Therefore, G1(T) need not be so high as when there is
no social security, the optimal T condition being given in that case by Tm(T) =
G1(T).13
To analyze the existence and uniqueness of the interior solution, we ￿rst de￿ne


































































If we assume that ￿ = 0, ! = 1 and s = 0, we will have that ￿ > 2￿0 = 2, the same condition that
Boucekkine et al. (2002) obtain [See Boucekkine et al. (2002), Proposition 2.1, p. 350.]
22the following auxiliary continuous function in x and ￿:
































From (41), (42) and (44) one has that T is an interior solution if and only if x = T
is a root of equation (44). Therefore, we will be able to discuss the existence and
uniqueness of the interior solution upon studying the properties of M(x;￿).
Our strategy will be as follows:
i) ￿rst, we will prove that M(x;￿) is negative in the origin x = 0 [Lemma 1] and
positive at x = Tmax > 0 for an interval of values of ￿ [Lemma 2]. The continuity
of M(x;￿) will assure us that there exists at least one x 2 (0;Tmax(￿)) for which
M(x;￿) = 0. [Proposition 1].
ii) second, we will show that such an x is unique. [Propositions 2 and 3, respec-
tively].
The argument is shown graphically in Figure 3.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
The following Lemma gives us su¢ cient conditions for M(x;￿) to be negative at
x = 0.
Lemma 1 Assume ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 1: if # > 0, then M(0;￿) < 0.
Proof : See Appendix.
The next step consists in obtaining the conditions on ￿ which guarantee that
M(Tmax(￿);￿) > 0. To this end we de￿ne the following auxiliary function K(￿) ￿

















which is continuous for ￿ > 0. We next characterize function K(￿).
Lemma 2 Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0: then i) K(￿) is continuous for ￿ > 0;
ii) if ￿ = ￿0, then K(￿) = 0; iii) there is a unique ￿￿ > 2￿0 such that K(￿￿) = 0;
and iv) K(￿) > 0 if and only if ￿ 2 (￿0;￿￿);
Proof : See Appendix.
The function K(￿) is represented in Figure 4.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE]
The following Proposition gives us the interval for ￿ such that there exists at
least one interior solution for T and R satisfying 0 < T < R < J, T < Tmax, and
equations (39) and (41).
Proposition 1 Existence. Su¢ ciency. Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1, # > 0 and ￿0 > 0. If
￿0 < ￿ < ￿￿, then there is at least one interior solution for T and R which satis￿es
(39) and (41), and for which 0 < T < R < J, T < Tmax.
Proof : See Appendix.
The following Proposition gives us su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of an
interior solution, i.e., for equation (44) to have a unique root.
Proposition 2 Uniqueness. Su¢ ciency. Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1, # > 0 and ￿0 > 0.
If ￿0 < ￿ < ￿￿, then there is a unique interior solution for T and R which satis￿es
(39) and (41), and such that 0 < T < R < J, T < Tmax .14; 15
14We owe the the last part of proof to `gueda Madoz, our research assistant.
15We believe that the proofs of Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 in Boucekkine et al. (2002) are
wrong. The authors claim that ￿Trivially, limx!+1 M(x) = +1 ...￿ , but this is not true. [See
proof of Lemma 2.2 on page 367, and proof of Lemma 2.3 on page 368.] Notice that m(x) as
de￿ned in (1) is identically equal to 0 for x ￿ J.
24Proof : See Appendix.
The following Proposition gives us necessary conditions for the uniqueness of the
interior solution, i.e., for equation (44) to have a unique root.
Proposition 3 Uniqueness. Necessity. Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1, # > 0 and ￿0 > 0:
if the unique solution for T and R is interior, that is to say, 0 < T < R < J,
T < Tmax, and satis￿es (39) and (41), then it must be the case that ￿0 < ￿ < ￿￿.
Proof : See Appendix.
In the next subsection we study corner solutions.
3.3.2 Corner solutions: 0 < T < R = J and 0 = T = R < J.
We obtain two possible corner solutions by considering four cases depending on the
value of ￿: i) ￿ = ￿￿, ii) ￿ > ￿￿, iii) ￿ = ￿0, and iv) 0 < ￿ < ￿0.
￿Case i): ￿ = ￿￿
Let us assume that ￿ = ￿￿: in this case, given (39), Tmax(￿) de￿ned in (43),
(41), M(x;￿) de￿ned in (44), K(￿) in (45) and ￿￿ in Lemma 2, T = Tmax(￿￿) and














Therefore, interior and corner solutions coincide. Notice that by de￿nition of ￿￿,
￿￿ > ￿0 and, therefore, Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ < J. Moreover, Tmax(￿￿) is the unique
solution which, being less than J, satis￿es (46). The following Proposition states
this result.
Proposition 4 Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0: if ￿ = ￿￿, then T = Tmax(￿￿)
25￿
J￿0
￿￿ and R = J is the unique solution to (39) and (41) such that 0 < T < J.
Proof : See Appendix.
￿Case ii): ￿ > ￿￿
The following Proposition states the solution for optimal T and R for values
of ￿ greater than ￿￿.
Proposition 5 Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0: if ￿ > ￿￿, then T
= Tmax(￿￿) =
J￿0
￿￿ and R = J is the unique solution to (36) and (37) such that
0 < T < J.
Proof : See Appendix.
Note that T = R = J is also a solution both in Case i) and in Case ii). However,
by using an indirect utility argument, this solution is dominated by T = Tmax(￿￿) =
J￿0
￿￿ and R = J. Leisure is zero in both cases (R = J) and so are pension bene￿ts.
But labor income is zero, and so is consumption, if T = R, while labor income and
consumption are positive if T = Tmax(￿￿) < R.
￿Case iii): ￿ = ￿0
Consider now the case of ￿ = ￿0. From (36) and (37) we obtain








Given that individuals never survive the age J, it must be the case that T ￿ J and,
therefore, R = T always. This implies, in turn, that individuals never contribute
to the social security and, therefore, # must be 0 if the social security budget is
balanced which, in turn, must be the case along balanced growth paths.
26Thus, focusing on balanced growth paths, optimal T is given by (47), (48),
T = minfT;Jg and # = 0 so that Tm(T) = 0 which admits two solutions: 0 <
T = R = J, where T = Tmax(￿0), and 0 = T = R < J. The latter is preferred
to the former. Why? Consumption is zero in both cases: both labor income and
pension bene￿ts are zero because T = R [recall equations (17) and (18)]. But leisure
is positive (R < J) in the latter case, and zero in the former (R = J).
The following Proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 6 Assume that ￿ > 1, ￿ < 0 and ￿ = ￿0 > 0. If social security budget
is balanced, then # = 0; 0 = T = R < J.
Proof : See Appendix.
￿Case iv): 0 < ￿ < ￿0
Suppose, ￿nally, that 0 < ￿ < ￿0. If this is the case, from (36) one has that
i) either R = J ￿ T￿=￿0, so that J ￿ T￿=￿0 < T; but this cannot be a solution,
as it is meaningless: individuals would study after retirement and death; or ii)
R = T￿=￿0 ￿ J which makes sense only if R = T = 0. Otherwise, if T > 0, one
has that R = T￿=￿0 < T and, therefore, R < T, which makes no sense. Individuals
would retire before completing the education period and entering the labor market.
The following Proposition states this result. The economic meaning of Case iv) [as
that of Case iii)] is absent: there would be no human capital, nor production, nor
consumption.
Proposition 7 Assume that ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 0. If 0 < ￿ < ￿0, then 0 = T = R < J.
Proof : Omitted.
Table 2 summarizes the results in Propositions 2-7. Note that for ￿ = ￿0 we
have only considered the possibility of social security budget balance.
27[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
3.4 Aggregates
In this subsection we obtain the aggregates for consumption and human capital at
time ￿. To this end we weight individuals￿decisions by the size of the surviving
population in the living cohorts, and sum them up across birth dates.






ntm(￿ ￿ t)dt; (49)
where C(t;￿) represents consumption at ￿ of an individual born at t and ￿entm(￿￿t)
denotes the measure of population of t-th generation still alive at time ￿:






ntm(￿ ￿ t)dt; (50)
where the last generation to enter the labor market was born at ￿ ￿ T(￿), and the
last generation to retire from their jobs was born at ￿ ￿R(￿). The cohort born at t
and still in the labor force has a measure equal to ￿entm(￿ ￿ t), and their members
have a stock of individual human capital h(t), making this a vintage model.
Vintage models are often used both in economies with physical capital and in
economies with human capital. In the ￿rst case the aggregate stock of capital in-
stalled in ￿rms consists of capital goods of di⁄erent ages, usually embedding di⁄erent
technologies (with more productive technologies in the more recent ones). In the
second (i.e.,our) case, younger workers incorporate higher levels of human capital
than their predecessors in a growing economy (although without their labor expertise
which, for simplicity, we are not considering here).16
16Among the ￿rst type one could mention, e.g., Gittleman et al. (2003) and Jensen et al. (2001).
28From (50) we de￿ne average human capital at time ￿, ￿rst introduced in the




where the denominator represents total population at time ￿, de￿ned in (8).
An indicator that can be used to explain growth in vintage models is the quality
of human capital. This is given by the degree of obsolescence of the human capital
which, in our case, is given by the average tenure of active workers L, which given
the age distribution (10) is equal to
L(￿) =
R R(￿)
T(￿) [a ￿ T(￿)]e￿na(e￿￿a ￿ ￿)da
R R(￿)
T(￿) e￿na(e￿￿a ￿ ￿)da
: (52)
The numerical exercises in Section 4, however, will not show a monotonic relationship
between L and ￿.
3.5 Social security
Assuming that social security balances its budget on a period by period basis, the
following equality must hold at each time ￿
Z ￿￿T(￿)
￿￿R(￿)
s!(￿)h(t)￿(t)m(￿ ￿ t)dt =
Z ￿￿R(￿)
￿￿J
b(t)￿(t)m(￿ ￿ t)dt: (53)
The left-hand-side represents the social security tax revenue from active generations
[i.e., born after ￿￿R(￿), but before ￿￿T(￿)]. The right-hand-side equals the pension
bene￿ts paid to retirees [i.e., individuals born after ￿ ￿ J, but before ￿ ￿ R(￿)].
3.6 Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium path for this economy is de￿ned as a sequence of quan-
tities fT(￿); R(￿); C(￿); h(￿); H(￿); ￿ H(￿); Y (￿)g1
￿=0 and prices f!(￿);D(t;￿) =
m(￿ ￿ t)g1
￿=0 such that
And among the second type, one could mention Boucekkine et al. (2002), Echevarr￿a (2003)-(2004),
Violante (2002), and Neuman and Weiss (1995).
29i) consumers maximize utility taking the sequences of human capital in the econ-
omy and wage per e¢ ciency unit, and the parameters representing the social security
policy fs;#g as given;
ii) ￿rms maximize pro￿ts taking the sequence of wage per e¢ ciency unit as given;
iii) the government chooses the replacement rate #, for a given social security
tax rate s such that social security budget is balanced at each instant; and
iv) goods market clears.
In this article we only consider balanced growth paths characterized by the fact
that aggregate variables fC(￿); H(￿); Y (￿)g grow at a constant rate or, equivalently,
per capita variables fh(￿); ￿ H(￿); w(￿)g grow at a constant rate ￿. Moreover, vari-
ables indicating education time duration T and retirement age R are constant and,
therefore, do not depend on the worker￿ s birth date.
3.7 The balanced growth path
De￿nition 2 Balanced growth paths in this economy are de￿ned as sequences of
quantities fT; R; C(￿); h(￿); H(￿); ￿ H(￿); Y (￿)g1
￿=0 and prices f!;D(t;￿) = m(￿ ￿
t)g1
￿=0 such that
i) conditions i)-iv) in De￿nition 1 are met, and
ii) all aggregate variables in per capita terms grow at a constant rate ￿.
In order to obtain the steady state growth in this economy, we ￿rst calculate the
rate of growth of aggregate human capital: the sum of population growth rate plus
the growth rate of average human capital. To obtain the latter we substitute (15)







If we take into account that along the balanced growth path ￿ H(t) = ￿ H(￿)e￿￿(￿￿t)
30must hold, and we make the following change of variable z = ￿ ￿t, on recalling the











dz = 1; (54)
which implicitly characterizes the per capita growth rate ￿ as a function of ￿, T,
￿, R, n, ￿ and ￿. Ceteris paribus, from (54) one can see that for higher values
of retirement age R or productivity in human capital production ￿, the economy￿ s
long run growth rate ￿ will be higher. If the education time length T becomes
longer, then an ambiguous result shows up: i) aggregate human capital is enlarged
(individual human capital stocks are higher), but ii) the share of active population
becomes smaller. From (54) one has the following Proposition.
Proposition 8 Assume that 0 < T < R < J. If there is a per capita growth rate ￿
that satis￿es (54), it must be unique.
Proof : See Appendix.
An open question is the convergence of this economy to the steady state. Equa-
tion (50) is exactly the same as the one obtained by Boucekkine et al. (2002). [See
equation (23) in Boucekkine et al. (2002), p. 353.]17
Given that along balanced growth paths R(￿) = R, T(￿) = T, !(￿) = !, and
￿ H(t) = ￿ H(￿)e￿￿(￿￿t), ￿(t) = ￿(￿)e￿n(￿￿t), taking into account (15), (17) and (18),
and after a change of variable z = ￿ ￿ t, the equation for social security budget










17In essence Boucekkine et al. (2002) show that the dynamics of aggregate human capital is
characterized by a second order delayed di⁄erential equation with delayed derivatives. Its resolution
requires numerical methods, because no mathematical result that sets conditions on the parameters
(T and R, in particular) for it to converge is known.
31Finally, if the solution for T and R happens to be interior, the payroll tax rate
s and the replacement rate # which balance the social security budget are unique.
Proposition 9 If 0 < T < R < J, then there is a unique pair of payroll tax-
replacement rates (s;#) which satis￿es the social security budget balance.
Proof : See Appendix.
Thus, summing up, along the balanced growth equilibrium path conditions (36),
(37), (54) and (55) must be met. This makes four non-linear equations in 4 un-
knowns: T, R, ￿ and # (for a given s). Unlike Boucekkine et al. (2002), it is
not possible to obtain a relationship between T and ￿ in our model: ￿ in￿ uences
T through social security budget balance which in turn a⁄ects #; and T a⁄ects ￿
through the growth rate equation. Therefore, it is not possible obtain a replica of
their Proposition 3.4. [See Boucekkine et al. (2002), Proposition 3.4, p. 355.] More-
over, once the individual problem and the uniqueness of the steady state growth
rate and the social security budget balance are solved analytically, all the results
that follow in the next Section are strictly numerical.
324 A numerical example
4.1 Calibration
In this Section we give values to the basic parameters to calculate numerically the
steady state equilibrium for a benchmark case. In order to illustrate the role played
by social security in our model, we run a ￿rst experiment in which we compare
the responses of this economy to exogenous changes in life expectancy under two
alternative scenarios: with and without social security. To this end, and taking some
features of the U.S. economy as an example, we use two sets of parameters which give
us to some approximation the same benchmark steady state.18 The summary of the
two sets of parameters, the steady state theoretical values for the benchmark model
and the empirically observed values are shown in Table 3. In a second experiment,
we analyze the e⁄ects of changes in social security policy.
Concerning our ￿rst experiment, we choose one set of demographic parameters
￿, ￿ and n so that we are able to approximate the observed mean and median ages
and the life expectancy at birth, ￿ a, ^ a and EV , respectively. The crude birth rate 1=￿
turns out to take a reasonable value too.19 As for the non-demographic parameters,
we choose two values for each of ￿, ￿ and ! in such a way that the resulting T, R and
￿ obtained with (s > 0) and without (s = 0) social security satisfy two conditions:
18At any rate, the parameter sets must be such that ￿0 < ￿ < ￿￿. If ￿ ￿ ￿0, condition (54) is
not met; and if ￿ ￿ ￿￿, from (55) one would have that # would be in￿nite. Therefore, we focus on
interior solutions for T and R.
19Data on n have been obtained from U.S. Census Bureau, National and Population Estimates,
NST-EST2003-pop-chg, Annual Estimates of the Population Change for the United States, and
Puerto Rico and State Rankings: July 1, 2002, to July 1, 2003, p.1, available at http://www.cen-
sus.gov/popest/states/NST-EST2003-pop-chg.html. For EV see 2004 World Population Data
Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Demographic Data and Estimates for the Countries
and Regions of the World, p. 7, available at http://www.prb.org. For ￿ a and ^ a see U.S. Census Bu-
reau, National Population Estimates, Characteristics, Annual Estimates of the Population by Sex
and Five Year Age Groups for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2003 (NC-EST2003-01)
p.1, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2003/ Finally, for data on
1=￿ see Vital Statistics, in U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005,
Table 72, p. 61.
33reasonably close between them and also to observed values, in particular in R and
￿.20
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
Once we have set up the benchmark case, the experiment consists in generating
a range of values for the life expectancy (between 40 and 100). There are 4 ways
of modelling increases in life expectancy depending on, ￿rst, whether these are due
to lower mortality rate for young or for old agents (higher ￿ or higher ￿, respec-
tively); and, second, whether the population growth rate or the crude birth rate
adjusts to mortality changes (constant n and lower 1=￿ or lower n and constant
1=￿, respectively). Here we focus on increases in life expectancy caused by lower
mortality rates for young agents and lower crude birth rates, and then we discuss
how our results would di⁄er if changes in ￿ or n had been considered. The results
are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. We run an additional experiment: keeping the
rest of the parameters constant, we analyze the response of our theoretical economy
upon changes in the social security tax rate s. The results are illustrated in Figure
7.
4.2 Findings
In our model the engine of growth is given by the change in the average human
capital of the economy. Average human capital, in turn, depends on, ￿rst, individual
decisions such as optimal schooling time and retirement age which (in the case of
T) a⁄ect not only their own productivity, but also the share of active workers in
20The value of s has been obtained from Coronado et al. (2000), p. 10. For data on T see
Butcher et al. (1994). Bassanini et al. (2001), p. 28, show the increasing time trend of average
years of education among working population for 21 OECD countries between 1971 and 1978. As
for retirement age R see, e.g., Gendell (1998). For ￿ see Income, Expenditures and Wealth, in U.S.
Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005, Table 648, p. 430. Finally, as
for the replacement rate, observed values vary substantially depending on the worker￿ s individual
characteristics. See, e.g., Diamond and Gruber (1997) or Kotliko⁄ et al. (1999).
34the population as T and R represent entry to and exit from the labor market,
respectively. And, second, demographic characteristics, namely the survival rate
distribution. Thus, falls in the mortality rate (i.e., increases in life expectancy)
imply both a behavior e⁄ect (through changes in T and R) and a composition e⁄ect
(through changes not only in the age distribution of workers, but also on the range
of active ages) which in turn imply changes in the growth rate. We discuss below
that both e⁄ects di⁄er depending on whether there is an unfunded social security
in the economy or not.
We graph the response of individual and aggregate variables (in Figures 5 and
6, respectively) to increases in the life expectancy under both scenarios, i.e. with
and without social security.21
As life expectancy goes up, education time length increases in both scenarios.
Higher survival probabilities increase the expected ￿ ow of future wages, thereby
giving incentives to extend the education time length. In eq. (37) the left-hand side
represents the marginal cost of increasing T, and the two terms on the right-hand
side represent the marginal bene￿t, i.e. the expected ￿ ow of future wages (pension
bene￿ts included). Without social security only the ￿rst term is present. With
social security (if pensions depend on past contributions), however, an additional
term shows up as the incentives to a higher T increase. [See Fig. 5:a.]
Concerning the retirement age decision, we can see in equation (39) that increases
in life expectancy a⁄ect R through both its e⁄ect on T (as in an economy without
social security) and the social security policy represented by the replacement and the
contribution rates # and s, respectively (which enter the de￿nition of ￿0). Therefore,
with social security the relationship between T and R is not proportional. In an
21The range of values for ￿ goes from 3:4 to 13:5; n and ￿ take on the same values as in the
benchmark case, 0:010 and ￿0:0170, respectively. As a result, EV ranges between 43:2 and 106:5,
and ￿￿1 between 0:028 and 0:015.
35economy with no social security, however, increments in life expectancy give rise to
increases in R proportional to those in T. [See Fig. 5:c.] Our numerical experiment
shows that increases in life expectancy allow a higher generosity of social security
because # becomes higher. Why? Workers are more productive (so that they con-
tribute more) and their survival probabilities are higher (particularly among young
agents). [See Fig. 6:a.] Therefore, (unfunded) social security gives incentives to
early retirement, as it is a well known fact in the literature. This explains why as
life expectancy becomes larger, the retirement age increases at a lower rate than in
an economy with no social security. In fact, for high enough levels of life expectancy,
R is lower with than without social security. [See Fig. 5:b.] Along these lines, Fig.
5:c shows the ratio of R to T under both regimes: without social security it is just
a constant; with social security, however, it is decreasing in T.
This lower increment in R implies that the active life length R ￿ T increases at
a lower rate with than without social security. So, even though the increment in T
is expected to be higher in the presence of social security (as discussed above), it is
lower than what it would have been had retirement age been exogenous. [See Fig.
5:d.]
We graph next the response of aggregate variables to increases in the life ex-
pectancy with and without social security in Figure 6. As advanced above, increases
in life expectancy bring about a higher generosity of social security represented by
a higher #. [See Fig. 6:a.]
Along a balanced-growth path economy, changes in active life parallel changes
in average tenure of active workers, L. [See Fig. 6:b]. Therefore, it is not surprising
that L increases along with life expectancy, but at a lower rate in the presence of
social security than in its absence, thus displaying a similar pattern to that one
of R ￿ T. This has a composition and a behavior (productivity) e⁄ect on the
36per capita growth rate of the economy. First, the share of active workers in the
population falls. Why? Even though the span of active life R ￿ T becomes larger,
the whole population age distribution changes: it can be shown that the weight of
young individuals relatively drops, while olders￿becomes relatively higher. However,
in an economy without social security the proportion of active workers increases with
life expectancy. This composition e⁄ect turns out to be crucial to understand the
response of per capita growth as we see next. [See Fig. 6:c.]22 Second, given the
lower rate increment in average tenure, the obsolescence of active workers￿human
capital will increase at a lower rate too.
We ￿nally arrive at the relationship between life expectancy and per capita
growth rate, and ￿nd that it exhibits an inverted U pattern under both scenarios.
In the social security regime, however, the negative sloped part shows up at much
lower levels of life expectancy. The explanation must be sought in the incentives to
early retirement that social security introduces and that, as we have just seen, make
the share of working population fall substantially. [See Fig. 6:d.]
More precisely, without social security the vintage characteristic appears to play
an important role in explaining the decreasing part of the inverted U: if mortality
rates fall, the proportion of workers whose schooling took place a long time ago (and
who have become obsolete) is higher. With social security, however, the vintage
characteristic does not play such an important role: the explanation must be sought
in the decrease in the share of workers: if mortality rates fall, growth rates may end
up decreasing simply because workers retire earlier.
[INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 AROUND HERE.]
22It can be shown that in the social security case, increases in life expectancy go along increments
in the dependency ratio (retirees to workers ratio), a well documented fact in real economies. [See,
e.g., Diamond et al. (1997).] In the no social security case, however, increments in life expectancy
accompany falls in the dependency ratio.
37How would our results have changed if we had allowed reductions in the popu-
lation growth n (instead of the crude birth rate 1=￿ )? Or in the mortality for old
agents through increments in ￿ (instead of the mortality for young agents through
increments in ￿)? Falls in crude birth rates along with increments life expectancy
and constant population growth rate are closer to the observed demographic charac-
teristics nowadays than constant crude birth rates and increasing population growth
rates. In terms of the model, the results (not shown for space saving) change only
quantitatively. Regarding whether the reduction in mortality rates a⁄ects mainly
young or old individuals, Kalemli-Ozcan (2002b) claims that during the last two cen-
turies life expectancy has doubled in most parts of the world mostly due to larger
falls in child rather in adult mortality.23 It can be shown that the main di⁄erence
shows up in the share of workers. If increments in ￿ rather than in ￿ are assumed,
the share of workers in an economy without social security decreases: the increase
in the population size mainly takes place at older ages.
How do these results match observed facts? Or, does the existence of unfunded
social security a⁄ect the response of the economy to changes in life expectancy? Let
us continue with the U.S. case and split the data into two periods, 1870-1940 and
1950-2000, which can represent our two regimes: without and with social security,
respectively.24 Regarding the ￿rst period, we observe what our model predicts that
increased life expectancy is accompanied by three facts: i) increased average years
of education, ii) an inverted U pattern for the average annual growth rate of per
capita GDP, and iii) a fairly stable labor force participation. [See rows 2-4 in
23Zhang et al. (2001) claim that during the early stages of mortality falls these concentrate on
the younger population; but as mortality keeps going down from low enough levels, most additional
years are gained after retirement age.
241870 is the ￿rst year for which we have found available data for the series. Social security was
￿rst introduced by the Social Security Act of 1935, although still in 1950 (when major amendments
were enacted) only about 50% of workers were covered. [See Social Security. A Brief History
(available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history) for further details.] Additionaly, the ￿gures
for the growth rates of per capita GDP were highly a⁄ected by WWII events.
38Table 4.]25 For the second period (see rows 5-7 in Table 4) the predictions of our
model partly resemble observed facts: as before, augmented life expectancies go
along with facts i) and ii). As for the observed aggregate (i.e., for both sexes)
labor force participation, it exhibits an increase as opposed to the decline that our
one-sex model predicts. Why? A major distinction between male and female labor
force participation rates must be made and in particular among younger and older
workers.26 Whereas participation rates among women have increased substantially,
men￿ s have declined: for those aged 16 to 24, the decline likely re￿ ects increases in
T; and for the elderly, the reason may be sought in a higher availability of pensions
and disability awards, i.e., social security. [See Fullerton (1999).] Our model does
not predict a decline in R in the social security regime, but it does predict a lower
increment in the retirement age. Perhaps an extended number of observations would
allow us to observe a deeper reduction in the per capita GDP growth rate and a
fall in aggregate participation rates as observed among male workers.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
￿Social Security.
Figure 7 shows the e⁄ects of changes in the social security contribution rate s.27
The ￿rst result is a net discouraging e⁄ect upon human capital accumulation and
retirement age.
25Sources of data for the two periods di⁄er. For the 1870-1940 period, the following sources
have been used: Maddison (1995) for education years, labor force participation and per capita
GDP growth; and http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~stephan/webstu⁄/demographs/life.data.html for life
expectancy. For the 1950-2000 period, the sources used are: Barro and Lee (2000) for education
years; Vital Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts (several years) for life expectancy;
and Fullerton (1999), Szafran (2002), U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract (2001) for labor
force participation, and Penn World Table for per capita GDP.
26The di⁄erence in the observed pattern for the participation rates between men and women
has been studied in the literature. See, e.g., Attanasio et al. (2004) and references therein. Two
additional forces help explain the behavior of observed labor force participation rates: immigration
and changes in the age distribution of population following the baby boom, neither of which our
model can account for. [See Fullerton (1999).]
27s ranges between s = 0:1% and s = 40:0%.
39A higher social security tax rate s reduces the net wage w(t) = (1 ￿ s)!￿ ￿ H(t)T
[for a given ￿ H(t)], so that incentives to devote a fraction of lifetime to education
T are reduced.28 R also drops signi￿cantly when s rises. As noted in subsection
3.3.1, R = ￿(1￿#)(1￿s)!T. Given that the replacement rate # remains relatively
unchanged, pension bene￿ts fall as well, so that incentives to lengthen the education
phase are reduced additionally, what generates an even larger reduction in R.
Given the reaction of R, it is easy to understand the response of the dependency
ratio, RD: the higher the social security contribution rate, the higher the depen-
dency ratio, and the lower the share of active workers. This result is in line with
Coile et al. (2000) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2002a), among others.
Once analyzed the behavior of T, R and RD, the performance of ￿ is as expected:
higher social security contribution rates go along with lower rates of per capita
growth.29
Finally, focusing on the replacement rate, # remains hardly unchanged. How
is it possible that (upon increasing s) RD goes up and # stays almost constant?
Remember, ￿rst, that # represents the replacement rate de￿ned on net wages (1 ￿
s)w; and, second, as noted in the beginning of this subsection, the social security
budget balance condition depends on the dependency ratio, the contribution and
the replacement rates and also the economy￿ s per capita growth rate ￿.
As a result, one would expect the generosity of the pension scheme to fall. One
way to measure this consists in calculating the ratio of the sum of present values of
expected pension bene￿ts to the sum of present values of expected social security
28In Zhang and Zhang (2004) the e⁄ect is just the opposite, but the mechanism is di⁄erent:
parents pay for their children￿ s education. Higher pay-roll taxes reduce the net wages that children
will obtain and increase parents￿incentives to spend more on their children￿ s education (and have
less children).
29Nevertheless, the values of s for which ￿ attains the maximum is not zero, but slightly positive:
in our numerical example, we obtain that ￿ = 2:3% for s = 1:4%. The existence of externalities in
the human capital accumulation explains why positive social security may promote growth.
40contributions. Thus, from (1), (31), (15), (16), (17) and (18), and recalling that









￿(J ￿ R) + e￿￿J ￿ e￿￿R￿
s[￿(R ￿ T) + e￿￿R ￿ e￿￿T]
: (56)
The relationship between G and s that we obtain is strictly decreasing. In fact, for
low enough s (in our numerical example s < 0:27), the G that we obtain is higher
than 1 (actuarially more than fair pension bene￿ts).
[INSERT FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE]
5 Conclusions
In this article we have studied the relationship between life expectancy and per
capita growth rate. We have used a vintage growth model with pay-as-you-go social
security where individuals choose education time and retirement age and where
pensions depend on the contributions made by workers during their active lives. This
way the ￿ ow of income during the retirement period also depends on the education
time investment.
The results obtained in the ￿rst part of the article are analytical. We have
characterized the individual￿ s parameter space which establishes the type of solution
for education length and retirement age. We have also proved the existence of, at
most, one steady state per capita growth rate and of one unique steady state budget
balance for the social security. In the second part we have compared the responses
of the economy to exogenous changes in life expectancy under two regimes (with
and without social security), obtaining numerical results.
In our model the engine of growth is given by the change in the average human
capital of the economy. Average human capital depends on, ￿rst, individual deci-
sions such as optimal schooling and retirement age which a⁄ect their own produc-
41tivity and the share of active workers in the population. And, second, demographic
characteristics, namely the survival rate distribution. We have seen that increases
in life expectancy imply both a behavior e⁄ect (through changes in schooling and
retirement age) and a composition e⁄ect (through changes in the age distribution
of workers and in the range of active workers) which in turn imply changes in the
growth rate. We have found that in an economy with no social security the vintage
characteristic seems to play a relevant role as the proportion of agents whose school-
ing was made a long time ago becomes higher with higher levels of life expectancy.
However, in an economy with social security the vintage description of the economy
does not play such an important role in explaining the decreasing part of the life
expectancy-per capita growth locus. In this case the decrease in the share of workers
as life expectancy goes up is the main factor.
Finally, we have studied the relationship between the size of the social secu-
rity and per capita growth rate of the economy. We have obtained that such a
relationship is mostly negative, except for very low values for the social security
contribution rate. The explanation is found in the discouraging e⁄ect that social
security imposes in education and, in particular, retirement age what causes a fall
in the share of working population in the economy.
We believe that this line of research deserves further empirical work, especially
in western economies in which life expectancy has reached substantially high levels
and where there is strong debate about the sustainability of current unfunded social
security systems and the convenience of postponing retirement age.
426 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting x = 0 into (44) one has that M(0;￿) = #
￿
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ln￿)]. Let us de￿ne f(￿) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ln￿). If # > 0 and ￿ < 0,
M(0;￿) < 0 , f(￿) > 0. Note that f(1) = 0 and f0(￿) = ln￿ > 0 8￿ > 1.
Therefore, if ￿ > 1, then f(￿) > 0 and M(0;￿) < 0.
Before proving Lemma 2, some preliminaries (Claims 1-8) are needed.
Claim 1. Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0: if ￿ < ￿0, then K(￿) is strictly
increasing.
























. Given the assumptions on ￿, ￿ and ￿0, K0(￿) > 0 , g(￿;￿) < 0.
Thus, it is necessary to prove that if ￿ < ￿0, then g(￿;￿) < 0. Notice the following
facts:
i) g(1;￿) = 0;











iii) h(￿;￿0) = ￿1 ￿ ln￿;
iv) h(1;￿0) = ￿1;
v) @h(￿;￿0)=@￿ = ￿1=￿ < 0; therefore,
vi) g(￿;￿0) < 0. We need to check how g(￿;￿) behaves for values of ￿ less than












Therefore, from vi) and vii) one has that if ￿ < ￿0, then g(￿;￿) < 0 , K0(￿) >
0.
Claim 2 Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0. i) K(￿0) = 0. ii) If ￿0 > 0, then
K0(￿0) > 0.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0.
i) Trivially, from (45) K(￿0) = 1
￿[￿￿ln￿ + ￿(ln￿ ￿ 1) + ￿] = 0.

















0 [2￿ ￿ ￿(2 + ln￿)] = ￿
￿(ln￿)2
￿0￿ > 0.
Claim 3 If ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0, then K(￿) is negative for all ￿ < ￿0.
Proof of Claim 3. From Claim 1 and part i) in Claim 2, it is trivial.
43Claim 4 If ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0, then i) K(2￿0) > 0, and ii) K0(2￿0) < 0.
Proof of Claim 4. Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0.





2 + 1 ￿ ￿1=2￿
= ￿1=2
￿ i(￿), where i(￿) ￿ ln￿
2 + 1 ￿ ￿1=2. Given






< 0 , ￿ > 1. Therefore, if ￿ > 1, then i(￿) < 0 and K(2￿0)
> 0.













. Evaluating K0(￿) at ￿ = 2￿0, one has
K0(2￿0) = ln￿







. Given the restrictions upon
￿ and ￿0, then K0(2￿0) < 0 , j(￿) > 0. Note the following facts:
ii.1) j(1) = 0;






ii.3) j0(1) = 1=2; and,





> 0 if ￿ ￿ 1.
Therefore, if ￿ > 1, then j(￿) > 0 and K0(2￿0) < 0.
Claim 5 If ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0, then one unique ^ ￿ 2 (￿0;2￿0) exists such that
K0(^ ￿) = 0.
Proof of Claim 5. Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0. From (45) one obtains
that K0(￿) =
￿0 ln￿









￿ for all ￿ > 0. Therefore, K0(￿) = 0 , g(￿;￿) = 0. Moreover, g(￿;￿) = 0 ,
l(￿;￿) = m(￿;￿), where l(￿;￿) ￿ 2￿
￿￿￿0
￿ and m(￿;￿) ￿ 2 +
￿0
￿ ln￿.
It can be shown that:
i) l(￿;￿) is strictly increasing in ￿;
ii) l(￿;￿0) = 2;
iii) l(￿;2￿0) = 2￿1=2;
iv) m(￿;￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿;
v) m(￿;￿0) = 2 + ln￿;
vi) m(￿;2￿0) = 2 + 1
2 ln￿;
vii) m(￿;￿0) > l(￿;￿0), whose proof is trivial;
viii) m(￿;2￿0) < l(￿;2￿0). Note that m(￿;2￿0) < l(￿;2￿0) , n(￿) ￿ 2 + 1
2 ln￿




< 0 if ￿ > 1.
Therefore, if ￿ > 1, then n(￿) < 0; equivalently, m(￿;2￿0) < l(￿;2￿0).
To sum up, from i), iv), vii) and viii) one obtains that there is one unique
^ ￿ 2 (￿0;2￿0) such that l(￿;^ ￿) = m(￿;^ ￿), that is to say, g(￿;^ ￿) = 0; equivalently,
44K0(^ ￿) = 0.
Claim 6 Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0: if ￿ > 2￿0, then K(￿) is strictly
decreasing.
Proof of Claim 6. Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0. From (45) one has
that K0(￿) =
￿0 ln￿









in ￿ for all ￿ > 0. We have proved in Claim 4 that K0(2￿0) < 0, that is, g(￿;2￿0) >










ln￿ > 0. Therefore, if ￿ > 2￿0,
then g(￿;￿) > 0 and K0(￿) < 0.
Claim 7 If ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 1, then lim￿!1 K(￿) < 0.
Proof of Claim 7. Assume that ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 1. From (45) one has that







￿o(￿), where o(￿) ￿ ln￿ + 1
￿ ￿ 1. Therefore,







Therefore, lim￿!1 K(￿) < 0.
Claim 8 Assume ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0. Then i) there is a unique ￿￿ > 2￿0
such that K(￿￿) = 0, and ii) K(￿) < 0 for all ￿ > ￿￿.
Proof of Claim 8. From Claim 4, Claim 6 and Claim 7 the proof is trivial.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. From Claims 3-5 and Claim 8 the proof is trivial.
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 the result is trivial.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿0 > 0. From Proposition
1 one has that there is at least one x 2 (0;Tmax(￿)) such that M(x;￿) = 0. To prove
that it is unique, we split M(x;￿) as the di⁄erence of two functions p(x;￿) and
q(x;￿), and prove that one unique intersection point exists between them.











ii) using the de￿nition of J, p(0;￿) = ￿ 1
￿ ￿#
￿(￿ ￿ 1) > 0;





￿ ln￿ + 1
￿
> 0;






x > 0, that is, p(x;￿) is strictly increasing in







x > 0, that is, p(x;￿) is strictly convex in x;
vi) q(0;￿) ￿ ￿ 1
￿ (#￿ln￿ + 1) > 0 and ￿ > 1;
vii) given the de￿nitions of J and Tmax(￿),














viii) @q(x;￿)=@x = e￿￿x(2 ￿ x￿)+ (1 ￿ #)￿
￿
￿0 > 0, that is, q(x;￿) is strictly
increasing in x;
ix) @2q(x;￿)=@x2 = e￿￿x(x￿
2 ￿ 3￿) > 0, that is, q(x;￿) is strictly convex in x;
x) p(0;￿) < q(0;￿) , ￿ln￿ ￿ ￿ + 1 > 0; see expression o(￿) in Claim 7;
xi) p[Tmax(￿);￿] > q [Tmax(￿);￿] , M [Tmax(￿);￿] ￿ K(￿) > 0 if ￿ 2 (￿0;￿￿).
[See Lemma 2.]
Therefore, p(x;￿) and q(x;￿) cross each other only once between x = 0 and x =
Tmax(￿), that is, there exists one unique x 2 (0;Tmax(￿)) such that p(x;￿) = q(x;￿)
, M(x;￿) = 0. The following plot in Figure 7 can help us understand the proof.
[INSERT FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE]
Proof of Proposition 3. Given (1), x = T is a solution to (37) if and only if
c M(x;￿) = 0, where














































The strategy of the proof will follow these steps:
i) ￿rst, we will prove that c M(J;￿) = 0;
ii) second, we will prove that for values of x less than and close enough to J we
will have that c M(x;￿) > 0;
iii) third, we will prove that c M(0;￿) < 0;
iv) fourth, given that c M(x;￿) is continuous, at least one x 2 (0;J) exists such
that c M(x;￿) = 0; and
v) ￿fth, if such an x is unique and interior, 0 < x < Tmax(￿) < J, then K(￿) > 0,
which implies that ￿ 2 (￿0;￿￿) as we have proven in Lemma 2.
In subsection 3.3.1 we have proven that if the solution is interior, then it must
be the case that ￿ > ￿0.





= J. Therefore, from (57) and (2) one has that c M(J;￿) =
J(￿ ￿ e￿￿J) = 0.






from (57) one has that

























￿￿J = ￿￿ln￿ < 0;
given that ￿ > 1. Thus, given i), for x less than but close enough to J one has that
c M(x;￿) > 0.




[1 + ￿(ln￿ ￿ 1)] < 0:
The previous inequality is immediately checked if we assume that ￿ < 0 and de￿ne
f(￿) ￿ 1 + ￿(ln￿ ￿ 1), so that f(1) = 0, f0(￿) = ln￿ > 0 and, therefore, f(￿) > 0
for ￿ > 1.
iv) Thus, given that c M(x;￿) is continuous, from ii) and iii) one has that at least
one x￿ 2 (0;J) exists such that c M(x;￿) = 0;
v) Given (43), from (44), (45) and (57) it can be obtained
c M [Tmax(￿);￿] = M [Tmax(￿);￿] ￿ K(￿):
If the answer of item iv) is unique and interior, that is to say, 0 < x￿ < Tmax(￿) < J,
then c M [Tmax(￿);￿] > 0. In this case, given the equality in the previous expression,
K(￿) > 0 and for this to happen we have seen that it is necessary that ￿ 2 (￿0;￿￿).
[See Lemma2.]
Proof of Proposition 4. The strategy of the proof is as follows:
i) ￿rst, we prove that T = Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ and R = J is a solution to (39) and
(41);
ii) second, we prove that it is the unique one which meets the condition 0 < T <
J.
i) Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1, ￿ = ￿￿ > ￿0 > 0. From Lemma 2 one has
that K(￿￿) = 0. Given the de￿nition of K(￿) ￿ M [Tmax(￿);￿], one has that
M [Tmax(￿￿);￿￿] = 0; equivalently, Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ < J is a solution to (41). In
this case, from (39) one has that R = J. In sum, T = Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ and R = J
satisfy (39) and (41), so that corner and interior solutions coincide.
47ii) To see that it is the unique one such that 0 < T < J we have to prove that
Tm(T) =
R R




T m(￿)d￿ has one unique solution T < J
[because, trivially, Jm(J) =
R J
J m(￿)d￿ = 0 by de￿nition of J in (2)]. Given (1)
and (2), it can be shown after some algebra that condition Tm(T) =
R J
T m(￿)d￿ is






￿ ￿(J ￿ T).
Note that
ii.1) r(T;￿;￿) is continuous in T and in ￿;
ii.2) by de￿nition of J, r(0;￿;￿) = ￿1
￿ (￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ln￿);
ii.3) r(0;1;￿) = 0;
ii.4) @r(0;￿;￿)=@￿ = ln￿
￿ < 0 if ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 0 and that, therefore,
ii.5) r(0;￿;￿) < 0 if ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 1.
ii.6) Given the de￿nition of J, r(J;￿;￿) = 0.
ii.7) @r(T;￿;￿)=@T = 2￿ ￿ (2 ￿ ￿T)e￿￿T and, therefore,
ii.8) if T = 0, then @r(T;￿;￿)=@T = 2(￿ ￿ 1) > 0 if ￿ > 1, and
ii.9) if T = J, then @r(T;￿;￿)=@T = ￿￿ln￿ < 0 if ￿ > 1.
ii.10) To sum up, from ii.1), ii.5), ii.6), ii.8), and ii.9), one has that at least
one d 2 (0;J) exists such that @r(T;￿;￿)=@T = 0 for T = d.
ii.11) Finally, it can be shown that @2r(T;￿;￿)=@T 2 = e￿￿T￿(3 ￿ ￿T) < 0 if
￿ < 0, that is, r(T;￿;￿) is strictly concave in T.
ii.12) Therefore, from ii.10) and ii.11) one has that there is one unique d 2 (0;J)
for which @r(T;￿;￿)=@T = 0 for T = d and, therefore,
ii.13) from ii.1), ii.5), ii.6) and ii.12) one has that one unique T [where 0 <
T < d < J] exists such that r(T;￿;￿) = 0 , Tm(T) =
R J
T m(￿)d￿.
[INSERT FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE]
Proof of Proposition 5. This is the strategy of the proof:
i) ￿rst, we will show that there is no x 2 [0;Tmax(￿)] such that (37) has solution
or that, equivalently, c M (x;￿) de￿ned in (57) takes the value zero.
ii) second, we will show that c M (J;￿) = 0, therefore J is a solution.
iii) third, we will prove that one unique x 2 (Tmax(￿);J) exists such that
c M (x;￿) = 0, where x = Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ , so that T = Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ , and R
= J:
48i.1) Assume that ￿ < 0, ￿ > 1 and ￿ > ￿￿ > ￿0 > 0. Given (43), from (44), (45)
and (57) it can be checked that
c M [Tmax(￿);￿] = M [Tmax(￿);￿] ￿ K(￿):
According to Claim 8, if ￿ > ￿￿, then K(￿) < 0. Therefore, c M [Tmax(￿);￿] < 0.
i.2) c M (x;￿) de￿ned in (57) can be rewritten as c M (x;￿) = ^ p(x;￿) ￿ ^ q(x;￿),
where















^ q(x;￿) ￿ xe






























^ q(x;￿) ￿ xe







i.4) ^ p(0;￿) = ￿1
￿ [1 + #(￿ ￿ 1)] > 0.

























￿0 > 0: ^ p(x;￿) is strictly convex for x 2 (0;Tmax(￿)).
i.8) ^ q(0;￿) = ￿1
￿ [1 + ￿#ln￿] > 0.


















@x = (2 ￿ ￿x)e￿￿x + ￿(1 ￿ #)
￿









e￿￿x: ^ q(x;￿) is strictly convex for x 2 (0;Tmax(￿)).
i.12) From i.1) and i.8) one has that ^ p(0;￿) ￿ ^ q(0;￿) = ￿ 1 + ￿(1￿ln￿) < 0.
i.13) From i.1) and i.2) ones has that c M [Tmax(￿);￿] ￿ ^ p[Tmax(￿);￿] ￿ ^ q [Tmax(￿); ￿]
< 0.
i.14) Therefore, from i.4)-i.13) one has that ^ p(x;￿) and ^ q(x;￿) do not cross
each other at any x 2 [0;Tmax(￿)]; equivalently, no x 2 [0;Tmax(￿)] exists such that
^ M(x;￿) = 0. And if there is some x for which ^ M(x;￿) = 0, then x 2 (Tmax(￿);J].





= J and, therefore, from (57) one has
that ^ M(J;￿) = 0, that is x = J is a solution to (57).
49iii) We are going to prove that one unique T 2 (Tmax(￿);J) exists such that
c M (x;￿) = 0, where T = Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ ; this way T > Tmax(￿), and R = J.
iii.1) From c M (x;￿) de￿ned in (57), for ￿ > ￿0 and for x close enough to J, one
has that
￿x





= J. Therefore, for x close enough to J,





















￿￿J = ￿￿ln￿ < 0:
Therefore, c M(x;￿) > 0 for x close enough to J. Thus, there exists at least one T
















And this is, precisely, Case i) studied in Proposition 4. Therefore, one unique T < J
exists which satis￿es the previous equation, so that T = Tmax(￿￿) ￿
J￿0
￿￿ < J if





￿ , ￿ > ￿￿. In short, if ￿ > ￿￿, then T = Tmax(￿￿) and R = J.
Proof of Proposition 6. If ￿ = ￿0, from (36) one has that R = T ￿ J, because T
cannot be greater than J. At any rate, R = T, so that social security tax revenues
are zero. Social security budget balance is required so that # = 0. From (47) and
(48) we obtain that
Tm(T) = 0: (58)
The strategy of the proof consists of two steps: ￿rst, we prove that (58) admits
only two solutions; and, second, we prove that the indirect utility function attains
a higher value in one of the two.
Equation (58) has 2 possible solutions: T = 0 and T = J. To check that





i) u(0) = 0: 0 is a solution;
ii) u(J) = 0: J is a solution;
50iii) u0(T) = e￿￿T(￿T ￿ 1) + ￿;
iv) u0(0) = ￿ ￿ 1 > 0 (u is increasing in T = 0);
v) u0(J) = ￿ln￿ < 0 (u is decreasing in T = J); and
vi) u00(T) = ￿e￿￿T(2 ￿ ￿T) < 0 [i.e., u(T) is strictly concave and, therefore, no
T 2 (0;J) exists which is a solution to (58)].
To sum up, there are two solutions: 0 = T = R < J, and 0 < T = R = J. The
situation is described in Figure 10.
[INSERT FIGURE 10 AROUND HERE]
Finally, we will prove that the indirect utility function is higher at T = 0 than
at T = J.
i) Substituting the rest of equality restrictions into the ￿rst restriction of (20) ;
ii) taking into account that !(￿) = ￿ !(t) = !, T(t) = T, R(t) = ￿T=￿0, and that
m(￿ ￿ t) = D(t;￿) [given (1)];
iii) solving for
R t+J
t C(t;￿)m(￿ ￿ t)d￿ and substituting into the lifetime utility
function (14);
iv) recalling that ￿ ￿ ￿￿, we obtain the indirect utility function for a solution
in which R = T￿=￿0 (without loss of generality, we assume an individual born at
t = 0), and
v) assuming ￿ = ￿0 and # = 0, we obtain











which, trivially, is decreasing in T. Therefore, solution 0 = T = R < J is preferred
to solution 0 < T = R = J.








where f(z) ￿ e￿nz ￿
￿ ￿ e￿￿z￿
> 0 if z < J. Denoting the left-hand-side of (59) by








if T < R, i.e., I(￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿. Therefore, at most one unique ￿
exists which satis￿es (59).
Proof of Proposition 9. From (1) and (55) this turns out to be trivial.
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56Tables
Table 1:
Country ￿ ￿ n EVO EVT ^ aO ^ aT J
Spain 27.9 -0.031 0.002 79.1 79.1 38.0 39.1 107.4
France 21.3 -0.028 0.005 78.8 78.9 37.7 36.3 109.2
Italy 21.4 -0.028 0.003 79.1 79.1 41.6 38.3 109.4
Great Britain 28.6 -0.032 0.004 77.8 77.3 36.4 36.4 104.8
Canada 21.9 -0.028 0.010 79.4 79.8 37.2 32.1 110.2
United States 29.7 -0.033 0.010 76.6 76.0 35.8 38.6 102.8
Key: EV , life expectancy; ^ a, median age; J, maximum age. Subindex ￿T￿denotes
theoretical value; and subindex ￿O￿denotes observed. Source for ^ aO: UNECE Statistical
Division United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Table 1.1. Basic Population
Data and Structures in 2001, http://www.unece.org/stats/trends/Ch1/1.xls. Figures cor-
respond to 2001. Source for EVO and n: US Census Bureau International Data Base,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsum.html. Figures correspond to 2000.
Table 2: Interior vs. Corner Solutions
0 < ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿0 < ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿




Table 3. Benchmark case
Demographics
Parameters Results
n = 0:010 (Id.), ^ a = 31:65 (35.9), ￿ a = 37:08 (36.2),
￿ = ￿0:017, EV = 77:93 (77), 1=￿ = 0:019 (0.015),
￿ = 7:5 J = 118:5
Non-demographics
Parameters with S. S. Results
s = 0:135 (Id.), ￿ = 0:286, T = 34:5 (12.33), R = 60:0 (61.6),
￿ = 0:485, ! = 24:302 ￿ = 1:97% (2.1%), # = 0:39
Parameters without S. S. Results
s = 0, ￿ = 0:251, T = 28:6, R = 60:0, ￿ = 2:0%
￿ = 8:3075, ! = 1:006
57Key to Table 3. Observed values are shown in parentheses.
Table 4. Without vs. with social security




1870-1890 41.4 5.6 1.89 37.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1890-1910 46.4 7.1 1.95 39.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1910-1940 56.5 8.2 1.13 37.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1950-1970 69.5 8.9 2.23 59.8 83.1 73.4 36.3
1970-1990 73.1 10.9 2.39 63.4 77.9 70.5 21.6
1990-2000 76.2 12.1 2.32 66.8 75.4 71.7 17.0
Key to Table 4. EV : life expectancy at birth; from 1870 to 1940, ￿gures correspond
to white males; from 1950 to 2000, ￿gures correspond to total population. T: from 1870
to 1940, years of schooling weighted by education; from 1950 to 2000, average years of
schooling. ￿: growth of per capita GDP (in %). LFPA: from 1870 to 1940 ￿gures
correspond to the employed population to the total population ratio; from 1950 to 2000,
aggregate labor force participation; LFPM: from 1950 to 2000, labor force participation
among male workers; LFP
y
M: from 1950 to 2000, labor force participation among young
male workers (16-24 years); LFP e
M: from 1950 to 2000, labor force participation among
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